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Introduction 
 Every year without fail thousands of students and parents descend on cities and 
towns across the nation to start a new year of higher education.  The specific date or 
weekend that they come is filled with orientations, social gatherings, moving things into 
the dorm room, etc.  After some tearful goodbyes, the parents begin to make the long trek 
back home.  However, before they begin their journey, many of them realize that they are 
low on gasoline and pull into a gas station, unaware that the cheaper gas station was just 
down the street.  Meanwhile, back at the university, many students are faced with the 
daunting task of learning which gas stations have the cheapest prices. 
 For this thesis, we have studied the prices of gasoline in college towns across the 
country during the big “move-in”.  While it might be supposed that prices would rise 
because of a demand increase, the reality might not be so simple.  We discuss several 
different theories, such as the loss-leader model or the tourists-natives theory, which 
could predict different price movements during the move-in.  
In our work, we sought to find out what gasoline prices would do in the face of a 
large increase in college students.  The data was collected in the late summer and early 
fall of 2009 from gasoline stations within a roughly ten-mile radius of over fifty 
universities and colleges across the country.  A difference-in-difference regression 
analysis of the data was used to compare the days that were impacted by the move-in 
effect with the other days in our sample.  What was discovered was that the price of 
gasoline not only did rise on the move-in day, but also was higher for days or weeks 
before and after the official move-in.  These somewhat surprising results may indicate 
that it took a long time for the uninformed students who had cars to figure out the price 
dispersion in the city.  
 In this paper, we will first look at the relevant literature surrounding the subject.  
Next, we will present the data and methods used for our tests.  After that, we will present 
the results of our analysis.  The conclusion will be the next and final section. 
The Literature 
 A simple look at the supply-demand model of prices would suggest that when 
demand increases, ceteris paribus, the price will also rise and the market will remain in 
perfect equilibrium, however, this outcome is not always the case.  If gas station 
managers are able to quickly increase volumes in response to even a small price increase 
then the short run supply curve would be effectively flat and there would be little to no 
change in prices on move-in day. In addition to the supply-demand model, there exist 
other price theories that provide alternative explanations for how prices could react to a 
demand change like the one during the move-in.  
The tourists-natives model is one such model and is well-known in the economics 
field.  The model assumes that there are two types of consumers: the natives (those who 
know what the prices are in a given market) and the tourists (those who do not).  For the 
natives in our situation, the costs for buying gasoline would simply be the price 
(assuming there is no travel cost), because they do not need to spend time searching for 
the cheapest station.  For the tourists, they must spend time searching for a gasoline 
station in addition to the price, which is commonly referred to as searching costs.  These 
searching costs make it more likely for a tourist to settle for a higher-priced station rather 
than spending an unknown amount of time looking for the cheapest place.  An increase in 
the amount of tourists would lead to higher incentives for other firms to increase their 
prices to take advantage of the tourists.  
 This is a very likely explanation for what will happen during the move-in boom.  
Parents and many incoming students probably have no idea of the gasoline price 
dispersion in the college city.  Even after the parents leave for home, many students, 
whom drive and have no idea what station charges what price for gasoline, will remain in 
the city for an extended period.  This could cause a prolonged move-in effect, where 
prices are high until most of the students learn the gasoline price dispersion.  This is also 
an annual event, so it is very predictable for gasoline stations.  However, it is unknown as 
to how many tourists will buy gasoline during the move-in.  It is possible that only an 
insignificant number purchase gasoline, leading to no real change in prices. 
Other alternative models focus on the possibility of a price decrease in the face of 
a rise in demand. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) were among the first to build a model of 
countercyclical pricing based on collusion.  They argued that, during a demand boom, the 
incentive to cheat on a collusion pact was high because of the greater possible profits 
gained from cheating.  If a firm were to cheat, the response is almost always a retaliation 
of even lower prices, which would create a price war where the market would eventually 
fall to the zero-profit, competitive level.  In order to prevent a business from cheating on 
their price agreement and the ensuing price war, the cartel will lower its agreed upon 
level to the point where the gains from cheating are less than the profits from colluding.  
On the other hand, when there is a demand bust, the possible profits from cheating on a 
collusive pact will decrease, which would allow the cartel to raise prices without fear of a 
firm breaking the pact. 
 A second paper, by Haltiwagner and Harrington (1991), amends Rotemberg and 
Saloner’s work by bringing expectations into the mix.  In their model, expectations of the 
firm on the direction that demand is heading determine whether to collude or to cheat.  
As long as demand is expected to rise a firm will still have strong incentives not to cheat 
because, by cheating, the firm would have to forego all of the increasingly higher future 
profits gained from a still increasing demand.  The opportunity cost from the profits 
gained by keeping the pact would just be too much.  When future demand is expected to 
decrease, however, the incentive to cheat grows.  This is because future profits are 
expected to decrease through collusion.  At some point the profits gained from cheating 
would outweigh the dwindling profits from colluding and the prices should drop.  
Borenstein and Shepard (1996) show some empirical support of this expectations 
argument in the retail gasoline market. 
 Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) use an altogether different explanation for 
countercyclical price behavior.  They use a loss leader model to describe why prices may 
decrease during high demand.  In this model, a retail firm will decrease the price on its 
most popular items in order to draw in customers.  Once the consumers are at the store, 
they are more likely to make other, less cheap purchases other than just the one item for 
which they were looking.  An example of this would be going to the store around 
Thanksgiving to take advantage of its sales on turkeys, but then decide to purchase a few 
bottles of Coke as well because it is convenient.  
 If the results were to show a price decrease, the next question that would need to 
be asked is which model best describes what happened.  It is very well possible that 
either the loss leader model has the best explanation because of the similarities between a 
large retail store and a gasoline station.  It is also just as likely that the collusion models 
are the best countercyclical explanation for the move-in effect because there has already 
been evidence shown for Haltwagner and Harrington’s expectations model by Borenstein 
and Shepard.  
The Data and Methodology 
 For this research, we wanted to see if gasoline prices changed over the move-in 
day.  To do this, we needed to find college towns and cities where the move-in day shock 
should be large enough to be noticeable, if it existed at all.  The criteria that we used to 
determine this were as follows: (1) they could not be located inside the Midwest because 
of the highly fluctuating price cycles found therei that could overshadow the effect caused 
by the move-in, (2) the city was not too big so that the sudden increase in demand would 
not go unnoticed, and (3) that the school was large enough to possibly make such an 
impact.  Using these as guidelines, over fifty universitiesii throughout the US were 
selected.  The names of the schools, their zip codes, the size of the student body, and the 
cities in which they were located had been recorded for the data set. 
It was also necessary to get the distances between each station and its school.  The 
address of each university and the website iTouchMap.comiii were used to find the 
relative latitude and longitudes of each school.  Next, the web page MSN Auto Gas Priceiv 
gave information on the prices, zip codes, station ID’s, and latitudes/longitudes of the 
closest thirty stations to each school with a few exceptions for some schoolsv.  The price 
data extends from the middle of August to the middle of November 2009—about a three-
month period—so that there was a wide range of data.  It should be noted that not every 
station recorded prices for every day, so that the data is incomplete in some places.  In 
fact, some stations recorded their daily prices so infrequently that it was decided that it 
would be better to remove them from the data setvi.  The prices are recorded in cents per 
gallon ($2.50 = 250 cents).  From all of the latitude/longitude information, distances from 
the university variables were generated that are measured in miles.  
Lastly, the move-in date, or the day that the residence halls opened, was located 
for each university by searching through each school’s websitevii.  However, it could not 
be determined when every school’s move-in date was and instead the move-in date was 
listed as the Saturday before the first day of classes.  That day was chosen because the 
weekend seemed to be the most likely of anytime to have students move back to school.  
The purpose of this research is to see how college move-in affects gasoline prices.  
To discover the effect, a difference-in-difference regression was created using a fixed 
effects equation.  The equation with fixed effects would compare the average price of all 
the stations in a city in the data on the move-in day with the average price in other cities 
that do not have move-in on that day.  This method would thus show the difference in 
prices on move-in affected stations from unaffected stations, essentially creating a 
difference-in-difference regression.  To do this, we set up our regression as a panel data 
set.  We regress price on city fixed effects, date fixed effects, and a dummy variable for 
the move-in day.  The city fixed effects is included because we wanted to control for any 
difference in prices based on properties unique to each city.  The date fixed effects was 
included to control for any seasonal price patterns.  In this way, we were able to separate 
any differences in daily prices because of seasonal patterns from the actual move-in 
effect. 
The Regressions/ Results 
For the first regression, we wanted to see what the prices in cities generally did on 
the move-in day.  What we found (see Figure 1), using the difference-in-difference 
method listed above, was a positive and significant result, where the coefficient indicates 
that the move-in caused a three-cent increase in prices on the move-in day compared to 
cities without move-in on those days.  While the rise is not gargantuan, it does still show 
strong support for rising gasoline prices during the move-in.  In case there was any 
autocorrelation bias in the results, clustered standard errors were used that are robust to 
serial correlation within a given city.  What was found (Figure 2) was an even more 
significant coefficient.  These results provide even more evidence for increased prices on 
the move-in day. 
For our next regression we wanted to see how the days around the move-in day 
looked. It might be expected to see a spike in prices around the move-in day that would 
die off soon after the day.  Since the parents would leave soon after moving their children 
to the campus, it could be reasonable to assume that prices return to a normal level.  
However, the next regression (Figure 3) fairly clearly shows this to not be the case.  In 
this regression, the price was also regressed on dummy variables for each of the days 
leading up to the move-in and on each of the days following it.  What these results show 
are an extended move-in effect that spanned from at least six days prior to the actual 
move-in through to about eighteen days after the move-in.  Almost all of the days listed 
in the regression are decreasingly positive and significant, depending on the length of 
time that has passed since the move-in.  
 That the move-in effect lasted for over two weeks after the move-in, while not 
expected, is not too surprising. There are students that actively drive while in school, and 
it is likely that those students that do not come from the campus city will not know the 
gasoline price dispersion any more than their parents. One explanation for the longer 
move-in effect could be that it represents the time that it took students to learn the prices. 
An explanation for why the move-in effect was affecting prices before the move-in day 
could be that campuses are active prior to the move-in. Campuses do not suddenly come 
to life on the move-in day, but are teeming with events and people for days prior. That 
people are already on campus days before the move-in could lead gasoline firms to raise 
prices sooner than the official move-in day. While the results do not definitively answer 
any causality questions, they do clearly show a protracted, positive move-in effect. 
In our next regression, we wanted to see how the distance of each station from the 
university affected the move-in effect. To do this we included distance fixed effects in the 
regression and used station fixed effects instead of city fixed effects. Now we were 
measuring the price difference of stations not affected by the move-in from those that 
were. The results (see Figure 4) show the impact of the move-in on prices for stations at 
the given distances.  The data shows that all the coefficients were positive and did not 
decrease with distance. In fact the effect appears to get bigger after the first few miles 
from campus.  The strongest coefficients that we see are actually the farthest from the 
campus; however, this may not be that surprising because of the small amount of stations 
that are that far from campus in our data set, which could bias the results.  For example, 
some schools may only have had two gasoline stations farther than seven miles from 
campus.  Regardless, this regression shows that the move-in effect was not restricted to 
only very local stations in the city, which suggests that gasoline buyers were just as likely 
to purchase their gas close to the station as they would be to go farther from campus. 
For our final regressions, we wanted to see how the size of the school impacted 
the increase in prices.  We expected to find that the larger the student body, the greater 
the impact on the prices.  We used the same approach as we did with the city average 
price regressions, but we used three dummy variables that indicated the size of the 
student body.  Large schools were identified as having student bodies larger than thirty 
thousand students.  Schools with under 15000 students were labeled small, and the 
schools larger than small schools but smaller than large schools were designated as 
medium.  Our results (Figures 5) show some support for our expectations. All three were 
decreasingly positive with size and significance.  However, the difference between even 
the big schools and the small schools was found to not be very significantly different.  
Overall, there may have been some difference between large schools and small schools, 
but the difference was not very substantial. 
Conclusion 
 In our research, we have tried to see the effect that college move-in day would 
have on gasoline prices.  The literature presented showed that there were multiple 
explanations for what gasoline prices could do in the face of an increase in demand.  We 
set up multiple difference-in-difference regressions to discover the move-in effect.  The 
results from the regressions strongly suggest that the price of gasoline did increase on the 
official move-in day.  In fact, it was shown that gasoline prices remained high for at least 
a week before the move-in day and for over two weeks after the move-in. 
Future research on the impact of demand spikes on the gasoline price market 
could look at the move-in date after winter break and the effect from home football 
games.  Other research should look more closely at whether these effects could be the 
result specific economic models such as the supply and demand model or the tourists-
natives model. 
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* Significance at the 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level  Figure 1 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2           Figure 3 
              
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error Move‐in Day 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Variable  Coefficient  Robust Standard 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Day 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Figure 4                                  Figure 5 
Size of School 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 Robust 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Error Big 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 3.278125* 1.1547 Small 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Move­in 
Variable 
Coefficient  Standard Error 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1 Mile from Campus 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 .6751924 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1 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Miles 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Campus 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 .4234885 Between 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and 3 Miles 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Between 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Miles 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Campus 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Between 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and 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Miles 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Between 6 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from 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Between 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and 8 Miles from Campus 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 1.015433 Between 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and 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Campus 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Between 9 and 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Miles 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>10 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Campus  7.972022* 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